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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
THE WINDING PATH TOWARD ACCOMMODATION

MARTHA McCARTHY*
Since the mid-twentieth century, some of the most significant church/state
controversies have focused on religious influences in public schools or
government aid to religious schools. Indeed, during the past several decades
the Supreme Court has had at least one Establishment Clause case on its docket
each term, and schools have provided the context for the most widely watched
decisions. This article focuses on the evolving law pertaining to public school
controversies, with particular emphasis on developments since 2000. Attention
will be given to public school access for community and student religious
meetings, student-initiated devotionals in public school events, and other
selected religious influences in public schools (reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance and distributing and posting religious materials). The last section
will briefly address potential conflicts between judicial rulings and the U.S.
Department of Education’s Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools issued in February 2003.1
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Interpretations of the First Amendment’s religion clauses have evoked
volatile debate and generated extensive legal commentary, but in the final
analysis, these provisions simply mean what a majority of the Supreme Court
justices conclude they mean. After all, it was “emphatically” established two
centuries ago that the judiciary has the authority and duty “to say what the law
is.”2 Not only are the various tests used to evaluate claims under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses judicially created, but the meanings
attached to these tests have changed over time depending on the composition
of the Supreme Court.

* Martha McCarthy, Ph.D., is a Chancellor’s Professor at Indiana University and specializes in
educational law and policy. Recent coauthored books include Public School Law: Teachers’ and
Students’ Rights and THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS, both published by Allyn
& Bacon in 2004.
1. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 68 Fed. Reg. 9645 (Feb. 28, 2003). See infra note 201.
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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The Supreme Court in the early 1960s relied on the Establishment Clause
to bar daily prayer and Bible reading under the auspices of the public school,3
but there have been numerous subsequent attempts to infuse religion into the
public school program. Constitutional amendments to this effect have even
been proposed on a regular basis.4
This article argues that Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation” between
church and state, which guided church/state litigation from the mid-twentieth
century into the 1980s, no longer characterizes Establishment Clause doctrine.5
The “wall” metaphor has been replaced by the concepts of equal treatment and
equal access for religious and secular groups and expression. The wall has
been referred to as a “blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier” that can only be
“dimly perceived,” 6 and even this indistinct barrier seems to be tumbling
down. Since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court has moved away from
interpreting religious neutrality as requiring church/state separation and has
embraced instead the notion that neutrality “affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
toward any.”7
Illustrative of the judicial shift in interpreting the Establishment Clause are
changes in the tests that courts use to assess claims under this provision. The
three-part Lemon test8 was used consistently in Establishment Clause cases
involving education issues from 1971 through the 1980s to invalidate a number
of government practices that were found to advance religion or create

3. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962).
4. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 7, 108th Cong., 149 CONG. REC. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003);
H.R.J. Res. 12, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. H223 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2001) (proposing
constitutional amendments to authorize voluntary school prayer).
5. Chief Justice Rehnquist has been one of the central critics of this metaphor. In 1985, he
declared that the wall “is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless
as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The origin of this metaphor was a letter written
by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 in which he refused a Baptist association’s request for a day to be
established for fasting and prayer in thanksgiving for the nation’s welfare. See ROBERT HEALEY,
JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 130-32 (1962).
6. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (emphasis added).
8. To withstand scrutiny under the traditional Lemon test, government action must: (1) have
a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion, and (3)
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971). See also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (adding the
entanglement prong in rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the tax exempt status of
church property).
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excessive government entanglement with religion.9 This stringent test has
been replaced by a judicial approach that employs an endorsement standard,10
a coercion test,11 a modified Lemon analysis,12 or perhaps all three, depending
on the situation. These multiple tests provide justices with more flexibility in
deciding whether religious accommodations are warranted under specific
circumstances. Given the evolving interpretations of the various tests, the
justices’ disposition seems more important in determining a case’s outcome
than is the choice of a particular judicially-created standard. Some courts have
appeared to fold the endorsement standard into the coercion test or have
otherwise combined elements from different standards in evaluating the
constitutionality of specific claims.13
Church/state controversies that involve competing claims under the
Establishment Clause, on one hand, and the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses, on the other, have been prevalent in recent public school cases.14
These cases are troublesome because accommodations to free exercise and free
speech rights can be seen as advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause, but efforts to guard against state sponsorship of religion
can threaten protections under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.
This interplay and tension among First Amendment guarantees have

9. In a case outside the school domain, the Court relied on “tradition” instead of Lemon in
upholding the practice of hiring a member of the clergy to open legislative sessions with a prayer.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983). For a discussion of the education cases
applying Lemon, see NELDA CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA MCCARTHY, & STEPHEN THOMAS,
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 25-65 (2004) (the historical
discussion of cases in this manuscript builds in part on this chapter).
10. Under the endorsement standard, government action will be invalidated if an objective
observer would view the actions as endorsing or disapproving religion. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at
687-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
11. This standard requires direct or indirect government coercion on individuals to adopt a
religious belief. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
12. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
232-34 (1997) (making it explicit that consideration of excessive entanglement is simply part of
the policy’s primary effect, thus modifying the Lemon test). This modified test is more like the
Establishment Clause standard used prior to 1971. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
13. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-12 (2000); Newdow v. U.S.
Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted in part sub nom., Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 104 (2001); Santa Fe,
530 U.S. at 301-02. In a higher education case, the Supreme Court recently noted the “play in the
joints” between the two religion clauses in rejecting a challenge to a state’s prohibition on the use
of scholarship funds for a student to prepare for the ministry. Davey v. Locke, No. 02-1315, 129
S. Ct. 1307 (Feb. 25, 2004). The Court found no violation of free exercise rights in restricting the
scholarship to secular degrees, even though use of the scholarship for pastoral studies would not
abridge the Establishment Clause. Id.
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complicated the judiciary’s assessment of the appropriate role of religion in
public schools.
II. EQUAL SCHOOL ACCESS FOR RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND GROUPS
In the 1960s and 1970s, it was often assumed that the Establishment
Clause demanded differential treatment of religious expression, resulting in the
exclusion of proselytizing speech from government forums.15 More recently,
however, the Supreme Court has concluded that the differential treatment of
religious perspectives compared with other private expression constitutes
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause.16 Ira Lupu
has observed that “even the standard-bearers of the separationist tradition have
been prepared to cede territory in the name of competing rights . . . . These
include the rights to be free of official discrimination with respect to religious
exercise, freedom of speech, and freedom of association.”17
Legal recognition of equal access for religious expression and groups in
educational settings often is traced to the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision,
Widmar v. Vincent, in which the Court held that the Establishment Clause does
not demand exclusion of student religious groups from a forum created for
The Court
student expression on state-supported college campuses.18
concluded that the provision of campus access to a range of student groups has
a secular purpose and does not advance religion or excessively entangle the
state with religion.19 Moreover, the Court held that if the university barred
student religious meetings, such action would abridge students’ free speech
rights.20 Although the Court in Widmar directly addressed the public forum
parameters in public universities, it did not resolve questions pertaining to
more impressionable, younger students.21

15. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1402 (10th Cir. 1985);
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 550 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-79 (2d Cir.
1980).
16. For some elaboration on this concept, see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S.
819, 890-99 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959
F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
17. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 249
(1994).
18. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
19. Id. at 274-75.
20. Id. at 269.
21. See id. at 271-72 (noting the differences between college and secondary students).
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Free Speech Protection of Religious Meetings in Public Schools

Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the First
Amendment’s protection against viewpoint discrimination in connection with
community religious groups holding meetings in public schools during noninstructional time. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, the Court held that if secular community groups are allowed to use the
public school after school hours to discuss topics such as family life and child
rearing, a sectarian group desiring to show a film series addressing these topics
from religious perspectives cannot be denied similar access.22 In short,
policies governing facility use during nonschool time that discriminate against
a religious group’s message abridge the Free Speech Clause.23
In 2001, the Supreme Court delivered an important decision, Good News
Club v. Milford Central School, allowing a private Christian organization to
hold its meetings in a New York public school immediately after classes
ended.24 The Milford School District had denied the Good News Club’s
request to hold afternoon meetings at the school by invoking its communityuse policy that allowed various civic and recreational groups to use the school,
but not for religious purposes.25 The club’s meetings admittedly were religious
in nature and designed to teach Christian values to children ages six to
twelve.26 Because the club was engaging in religious worship and instruction,
the school district argued that the meetings right after school would appear to
bear the school’s imprimatur in violation of the Establishment Clause.27
The lower courts agreed with the school district, but the Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit’s decision.28 The Court majority in Milford held
that the school district’s policy discriminated against religious viewpoints and

22. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-97.
23. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46 (invalidating a state-supported university’s
policies that singled out student religious groups in denying them student activity funds to use in
distributing religious materials); see infra note 155 and accompanying text.
24. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). See also Culbertson v.
Oakridge Sch. Dist. No. 76, 258 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the Good News
Club’s right to meet in the public school after school hours but prohibiting teachers from
distributing permission slips for the meetings because such action would unconstitutionally
promote the club).
25. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13.
26. Mark Walsh, Religious Club Seeks ‘Good News’ From Court, EDUC. WK., February 21,
2001, at 20. The club is affiliated with a national organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship,
which has more than 4,500 clubs nationwide. Id. According to the Good News Club literature,
its purpose is to “evangelize boys and girls with the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ and establish
them in the Word of God and in the local church for Christian living.” Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch.
Dist. 49-5, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D.S.D. 2003).
27. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13.
28. Id. at 112-14.
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thus abridged the Free Speech Clause.29 The majority relied heavily on its
reasoning in Lamb’s Chapel,30 even though Milford school authorities
attempted to distinguish the showing of films primarily to adults from meetings
of the Good News Club that target young children and involve religious
instruction and prayer.31 Finding this distinction without merit, the Supreme
Court noted that it is constitutionally irrelevant whether moral lessons are
taught through films or live storytelling and prayers.32 Like the religious group
in Lamb’s Chapel, the majority reasoned that the Good News Club could not
be denied school access based on the religious content of its meetings.33 The
majority declared that the Court had never barred private religious conduct
during nonschool hours simply because elementary school children might be
present.34 While not refuting Justice Souter’s contention in his dissenting
opinion that the clergy-led meetings were “evangelical” worship services,35 the
majority instead focused on Free Speech Clause protection of the religious
viewpoints expressed during the club’s devotional meetings.36 Under the
Milford ruling, if a public school creates a limited forum for community
meetings during nonschool hours, it cannot deny access to religious groups,
even though students attending the school are the central participants in the
groups’ devotional activities.37 In Milford, free speech rights clearly prevailed
over Establishment Clause restrictions.
The Supreme Court in Milford seemed to eliminate the distinction between
religious viewpoints and religious worship. Prior to Milford, some lower
courts had condoned the use of public school facilities for community groups
to discuss topics from sectarian perspectives but had not allowed public
schools to be used for religious worship.38 Yet, in post-Milford decisions,
courts have held that religious groups must be allowed to hold devotional

29. Id.
30. Id. at 107-14.
31. Id. at 108.
32. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108-110. See also Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch.
Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1503 (8th Cir. 1994).
33. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115.
34. Id. But see Wigg, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (upholding the school district’s denial of a
teacher’s request to participate in Good News Club meetings immediately after school at the
school where she taught given Establishment Clause concerns, but recognizing that she could
attend such meetings held at other schools).
35. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 109-10.
37. Id. at 113.
38. See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the school district’s policy excluding religious services from the limited forum created
for community use); Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 27, 164 F.3d 829 (2d Cir. 1999)
(upholding the denial of a religious group’s use of school facilities because the district had not
created a forum for religious worship); see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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services in public schools, if other community groups are granted school
access.39 For example, an evangelical church in New York City had been
denied public school access to hold Sunday worship services based on the
school district’s standard operating procedures that allowed school premises to
be used for a variety of community activities excluding religious services or
instruction.40 The Second Circuit approved the school district’s action in
1997,41 but in light of the Milford ruling, the church again applied for use of
school space.42 This time, the Second Circuit held that because the Supreme
Court in Milford had overruled its earlier holding, the school district’s policy
distinguishing worship from the discussion of religious viewpoints violated the
religious group’s free speech rights.43 The appeals court quoted the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Milford that “quintessentially religious activities could
be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character development
from a particular viewpoint,” which triggers Free Speech Clause protection.44
Some student religious clubs have also relied in part on the First
Amendment to challenge their discriminatory treatment in public schools. The
Ninth Circuit found a school district had committed viewpoint discrimination
against a student religious club with respect to access to school supplies, audiovisual equipment, and school vehicles.45 Moreover, the court held that even
though the student/staff period was considered instructional time, the religious
group should be treated like secular student groups in being allowed to meet
during this period.46 The court declared that such equal access is required by
the Free Speech Clause and does not violate the Establishment Clause.47 The
Third Circuit similarly ruled that a school’s denial of a student bible club’s
request to meet during the student activity period, when secular student clubs
were allowed to meet, constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the
Free Speech Clause.48 Declining to decide whether viewpoint discrimination
could be justified by a state’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause
infraction, the court noted that it did not have to confront “this thorny issue”
because the Establishment Clause was not implicated by the club’s request.49

39. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 300 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2002), on
remand, No. 98-2605 Sect. C(1), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559, *19 (E. D. La. July 29, 2003).
40. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
41. Id.
42. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id. at 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111).
45. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003).
46. Id. at 1091.
47. Id. at 1091-92. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
48. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).
49. Id. at 226.
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These cases also involved claims under the Equal Access Act that are
addressed below.50
B.

Equal Access Act and Student Devotional Meetings

Given that into the 1980s high school students were having little success in
securing First Amendment protection of their religious meetings during noninstructional time,51 Congress enacted the Equal Access Act (EAA) in 1984.52
Under this law, federally assisted secondary schools that have established a
limited forum for student groups to meet during non-instructional time cannot
deny school access to noncurriculum student groups based on the religious,
philosophical, or political content of their meetings.53 Although championed
by the religious right, the EAA’s protection of student expression extends far
beyond religious speech.
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the EAA,
recognizing the law’s secular purpose of preventing discrimination against
religious and other types of private student expression.54 The Court
emphasized that while government speech promoting religion is prohibited by
the Establishment Clause, private religious expression is protected by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.55 Federal appellate courts in subsequent
cases have ruled that state laws requiring greater separation of church and state
than demanded by the Establishment Clause must yield to federal rights
guaranteed by the EAA56 and that the EAA allows a student religious group to
ensure the spiritual content of its meetings by requiring certain officers to be
Christians.57

50. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1078-83; Donovan, 336 F.3d at 219-25. It had generally been
assumed that the EAA extended protection of student expression in public schools beyond
constitutional guarantees, but in both of these cases, the religious clubs realized greater relief
under the First Amendment than the EAA.
51. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1396 (10th Cir. 1985);
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1984).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2002).
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2002). School staff can be present at religious meetings only
in a “nonparticipatory capacity” to maintain order. Id. at § 4071(c)(3).
54. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990).
55. Id. at 250.
56. See Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trs., 66 F.3d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting the EAA
as allowing student religious groups to meet during the lunch period since it was non-instructional
time and other student groups were allowed to meet); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987
F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the EAA prevailed over state law requiring greater
separation of church and state than demanded by the Establishment Clause; thus, a student
religious group was entitled to meet during the public school’s limited forum for student
meetings).
57. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 856 (2d Cir. 1996).
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The Third Circuit continued this expansive interpretation of the EAA’s
protection of student religious expression in 2003. The appellate court held
that a school’s student activity period was non-instructional time, even though
students were required to be in a club meeting, study hall, library, tutoring
session, or similar activities during the period.58 Ruling that the school had
created a limited open forum in the activity period for noncurriculum student
groups to meet, the court declared that “to conclude that mandatory attendance
means that any school period is actual classroom instruction is to undercut both
the specific language and the statutory purpose of the EAA.”59 Thus, student
religious groups were allowed to meet during the activity period.60
However, the Ninth Circuit reached an opposite conclusion regarding what
constitutes non-instructional time, reasoning that a student/staff period, when
student clubs were allowed to meet, was instructional time because students
were expected to be present and attendance was taken.61 Despite this finding,
the Ninth Circuit broadly interpreted EAA rights as entitling the student
religious club to be featured in the school yearbook free of charge and to use
the public address system and bulletin boards, like secular groups, as part of
school access for their meetings.62 And, as noted previously, the club also was
able to use the First Amendment to secure access to the student/staff period as
well as other school resources available to secular clubs, even though these
entitlements were not covered by the EAA.63
School districts can comply with the EAA by restricting school access to
student clubs that are curriculum related (i.e., declining to create a limited
forum for student expression). Thus, some controversies have focused on what
constitutes curriculum-related clubs, and most of these cases have not dealt
with religious groups.64 Courts generally have reasoned that to be considered
curriculum related, the club must relate to content that has actually been taught
in courses.65 In a case involving the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, a
California appeals court held that the noncurriculum club itself would not have

58. See Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003).
59. Id. at 223.
60. Id. at 214.
61. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1088.
62. Id. at 1074.
63. Id. at 1089-90. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. Many of these cases have dealt with the Gay/Straight Alliance. See, e.g., Boyd County
High Sch. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin v.
Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance
v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999).
65. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-46 (1990);
Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1251-54 (3d Cir. 1993).
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to be student-initiated to be protected under the EAA — only its on-campus
meetings would need to be initiated by students.66
Since the 1980s, the EAA has provided substantial protection to student
religious meetings in secondary schools during non-instructional time, and
initially this law appeared to provide more protection than available under the
First Amendment.67 In fact, dissatisfaction with the constitutional protection
of student religious expression in public schools provided the impetus for
enactment of the EAA.68 Recently however, the Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted the First Amendment’s prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination as giving considerable protection to private speech, including
Because First Amendment
religious expression, in public schools.69
protections are not confined to federally funded schools or to the secondary
level, this may portend fewer EAA suits and more First Amendment claims
involving student devotional meetings in public schools. A key consideration
in the constitutional cases is how broadly courts will interpret the category of
protected private expression, which is addressed in the next section.
III. STUDENT-INITIATED DEVOTIONALS: PRIVATE ACTORS?
Among the most controversial current church/state issues is whether the
Establishment Clause is implicated when students initiate and lead devotionals
in certain situations in public schools. In short, what constitutes private
religious expression in the public school context that is protected by the Free
Speech Clause and does not abridge the Establishment Clause?
A.

The Aftermath of Weisman

Part of the motivation for the recent wave of legislative activity pertaining
to student-initiated religious activities in public schools was the negative
reactions to the 1992 decision, Lee v. Weisman, in which the Supreme Court

66. Schoick v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 568 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (finding triable issues regarding whether the school had established a limited forum
for noncurriculum student groups to meet).
67. Compare Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244-247 (holding that if a federally assisted secondary
school allows one noncurriculum group to meet it is subject to the EAA and must not
discriminate against student expression based on its content) with Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 267-73 (1988) (interpreting the First Amendment as giving broad authority to school
personnel to censor student expression in school publications and school-related activities unless
the school had explicitly created a forum for student expression); see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
68. See S. REP. NO. 98-357 at 3-4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349-50
(describing the history of the legislation, including the arguments of the religious leaders and
other representatives of religious organizations who spoke in support of the EAA).
69. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 820; Lamb’s
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
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struck down a Rhode Island school district’s policy that permitted principals to
invite clergy members to deliver invocations and benedictions at middle and
high school graduation ceremonies.70 In Weisman, the majority reasoned that
the policy had a coercive effect; students should not have to make a choice
between attending their graduation ceremony and respecting their religious
convictions. 71 Although Weisman was a separationist decision, the Court=s
ruling did not reduce graduation devotionals as intended.72 In fact, it had quite
the opposite effect, as negative reactions to this ruling resulted in school
authorities and students finding creative strategies to include prayers in
graduation ceremonies.73 In some districts, baccalaureate services, which had
not been held for many years, were reinstated with the districts renting space to
churches or other groups to conduct the religious services for their graduates.74
Many post-Weisman controversies have involved student-led devotionals
that allegedly do not abridge the Establishment Clause because they are
protected by the Free Speech Clause and do not represent the public school.
Some school districts have designated the graduation ceremony a forum for
student expression. As a result, school personnel do not review students’
messages, and thus religious comments are not considered school sponsored.
The Ninth Circuit upheld an Idaho school district’s policy that barred school
authorities from censoring students’ graduation speeches presented in a forum
created for student speakers to select “an address, poem, reading, song, musical
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement of their choosing.”75 The

70. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
71. Id. at 597-599. The Court’s majority reasoned that the policy had a coercive effect
because students felt peer pressure to participate in the devotionals that were conducted at the
school-sponsored graduation ceremony. However, four of the justices who joined the majority
also signed concurring opinions in which they asserted that coercion would be sufficient to
abridge the Establishment Clause, although it is not a necessary prerequisite. Id. at 599
(Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, J. J., concurring); id. at 609 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens and O’Connor, J. J., concurring).
72. Martha McCarthy, Free Speech Versus Anti-Establishment: Is There a Hierarchy of
First Amendment Rights?, 108 EDUC. L. J. 475, 481 (1996).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (D. Wyo.
1993) (holding that students could rent the high school gym for a baccalaureate program because
the event was not school sponsored, even though the school band performed and the district’s
graduation announcements mentioned the baccalaureate program); Verbena United Methodist
Church v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 704, 715 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that a
school board must take all reasonable measures necessary to remove itself from a baccalaureate
service sponsored by religious organizations and held in space rented from the school district).
75. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded
en banc, 177 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Goluba v. Sch. Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d
1035, 1036 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that student-initiated recitation of the Lord’s Prayer
immediately before the high school graduation ceremony did not represent the school and thus

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

576

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:565

court reasoned that the policy was permissible because student speakers were
selected based on secular criteria (academic standing) and not encouraged by
school personnel to include devotionals in their remarks.76 Upon rehearing the
case, the full appellate court vacated the panel decision because the plaintiff
had graduated, but the contested policy was not invalidated.77
In two other Ninth Circuit cases, however, the appeals court allowed
school districts to prevent students from delivering proselytizing graduation
speeches that had been submitted to the school principals for review pursuant
to school policies.78 In one of these cases, which the Supreme Court declined
to review, the school district had informed the student that proselytizing parts
of his graduation speech would have to be removed to respect the
Establishment Clause, but the student could retain references to his own
beliefs.79 The student then suggested that a notation be included in the
graduation program, disclaiming school sponsorship of his speech, which he
argued would eliminate the school’s Establishment Clause vulnerability for the
proselytizing message. The school declined to do this but allowed the student
to announce that his speech had been involuntarily altered and that those
interested could get a copy of the full text following the ceremony. The court
found that requiring the speech to be altered instead of issuing a disclaimer did
not violate the student’s First Amendment rights.80 School authorities in this
district had clearly maintained control of the graduation ceremony, and the
court found censorship of proposed religious speeches appropriate to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation.81 The central consideration in these cases
appears to be whether the school has explicitly established a forum for student
expression in the graduation ceremony; if not, school personnel can review
students’ graduation speeches, and they may have a duty to censor
proselytizing speeches.
B.

Authorizing Devotionals Through Student Elections

Some school districts responded to Weisman by allowing students to
decide through voting whether to include student-led devotionals in graduation
ceremonies and other school activities; this practice has been extremely

did not violate an injunction prohibiting school personnel from authorizing, conducting,
sponsoring, or intentionally permitting prayers during the graduation ceremony).
76. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835.
77. Doe, 177 F.3d at 799.
78. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 78 (2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2000).
79. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 981-82 (all facts in this section are taken from pages 981-82 of the
court’s opinion).
80. Id. at 984.
81. Id.
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controversial. The Fifth Circuit upheld the practice of allowing students to
decide by election whether to have nonsectarian graduation prayers selected
and delivered by students, concluding that the student election breaks the link
to school sponsorship.82 The court further reasoned that the school district’s
resolution authorizing seniors to choose students to deliver the invocations had
the purpose and primary effect of solemnizing graduation ceremonies and not
advancing religion.83 However, the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
rendered opposite opinions, ruling that school authorities could not delegate to
students decisions that the Establishment Clause forbids school districts from
making. 84 Such elections would impermissibly allow the majority of students
to impose their religious preferences on all students holding minority beliefs.
In a significant decision in 2000, Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, the Supreme Court found that a Texas school district’s policy authorizing
student-led devotionals before school football games violated the
Establishment Clause.85 Prior to 1995, the student council had a designated
chaplain, who delivered a prayer at all home varsity football games. After this
practice and other initiatives returning devotionals to the schools were
challenged, the district adopted a policy governing prayer at football games
and a similar graduation prayer policy that authorized an election to determine
whether to have invocations with a second election to select the student to
deliver them.
Both policies subsequently removed the “nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing” restriction on the prayers86 but specified that if judicially
enjoined, the earlier policies with this restriction would be in effect.87

82. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1992). See also
Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a challenge to a state-supported
university’s use of invocations and benedictions in commencement ceremonies; finding no
coercion on adult students who have the maturity to choose among competing beliefs).
83. Jones, 977 F.2d at 986.
84. ACLU of N.J. v. Blackhorse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir. 1996);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir.1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1154
(1995). See also Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating
a Mississippi law that allowed student-initiated prayers in all school assemblies, sporting events,
commencement ceremonies, and other school-related events as violating the Establishment
Clause by permitting student-led prayers at virtually all school activities); Comm. for Voluntary
Prayer v. Wimberley, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1997) (striking down a voter initiative to authorize
student-initiated voluntary prayer in most school-related activities as clearly intended to
encourage prayer).
85. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809-14 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S.
290 (2000) (all facts in this section are taken from pages 809-14 of the court’s opinion).
86. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1782 (1993) defines “prayer” as
“a solemn and humble approach to Divinity in word or thought.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1538 (1993) defines the term “nonsectarian” as “not being an
adherent of a particular religious sect or reflecting narrow attachment to a sect or denomination.”
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The Fifth Circuit reiterated its position that an election can be used to
authorize student-initiated graduation prayers, even though it rejected the
assertion that such devotionals could be considered private speech or that the
graduation ceremony is a limited public forum.88 However, the court held that
the football game policy abridged the Establishment Clause, even with the
stipulation that the prayers had to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.89 The
court distinguished student-led graduation prayers from devotionals at athletic
events that occur more often, involve a greater student age range, and cannot
be justified as necessary to make sporting events more solemn.90
The Supreme Court addressed only the policy authorizing student-led
prayers before football games and struck it down as representing schoolsponsored devotionals.91 The Court found both perceived and actual
endorsement of religion and was not convinced that the student elections
eliminated the Establishment Clause infraction.92 The majority held that
student-led devotionals at a school event, on school property, and representing
the student body under the supervision of school personnel, could not be
considered private speech.93 In holding that the use of student elections simply
ensures that minority views would never be aired, the Court recognized that the
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain topics from being subjected to
majority rule.94 The Court emphasized that even though the choice of speakers
and content was made by the students, the school organized the student
election.95 Although the Court did not rule that delegating decisions to
students removed Establishment Clause concerns, it stressed that there must be
evidence of government sponsorship of devotionals to abridge the First
Amendment.96

Because prayer by its nature depicts a particular faith (those believing in prayer and God),
“nonsectarian prayer” appears to be an oxymoron.
87. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812-13.
88. Id. at 820.
89. Id. at 816-18. See also Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-407 (5th
Cir. 1995) (describing a high school graduation as a “once in a lifetime event” contrasted with
athletic events that are held in settings far less solemn and extraordinary).
90. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 822-23.
91. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-03 (2000).
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id. at 310.
94. Id. at 316-17 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236 (2000) (upholding
a university’s mandatory student activity fees, but ruling that student elections to determine what
speech is subsidized by the university abridge the Free Speech Clause by disenfranchising those
who hold minority views)).
95. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
96. Id. at 313. In his strident dissent in Santa Fe, Chief Justice Rehnquist faulted the
majority for its holding and for its tone, which he claimed “bristles with hostility to all things
religious in public life.” Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
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Santa Fe, like Weisman, is considered a separationist decision,97 but it did
not resolve what distinguishes protected private religious expression from
unconstitutional school-sponsored devotionals. Santa Fe involved a blatant
effort to impose prayer and was preceded by a series of school district
initiatives designed to promote Christian doctrine at school events.98 Thus,
even an accommodationist-leaning court could not condone the challenged
practice in Santa Fe without totally abandoning the Establishment Clause.
In several pre- and post-Santa Fe rulings, some of which the Supreme
Court has declined to review, federal appellate courts have expansively
interpreted the reach of the Free Speech Clause in protecting students’ private
religious expression in public schools.99 For example, in Adler v. Duval
County School Board in 2000, the full Eleventh Circuit reversed the appellate
panel’s decision that had invalidated a challenged school district policy.100
The appellate court en banc upheld the policy authorizing seniors to identify
classmates to give graduation messages that the speakers select.101 Even
though the school district’s memo outlining the policy was entitled
“Graduation Prayer,” the court declared that the student elections were not to
identify classmates to deliver devotionals because the content of the graduation
messages was determined by the students.102
A second Eleventh Circuit ruling, Chandler v. James, lifted part of an
injunction that had prohibited students from publicly expressing religious
views in most public school activities in Dekalb County, Alabama.103 At issue
was a 1993 Alabama law, enacted in response to the Weisman decision, which
97. Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v.
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 808 (2001).
98. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307-09. The Court carefully reviewed the school district’s history
of Christian observances in its schools. The initial suit in 1995 complained of numerous
proselytizing activities (i.e., teachers promoting Christian revival meetings and chastising
children of minority faiths) in addition to the school district’s practice of allowing students to
read overtly Christian prayers at graduation ceremonies and home football games. Id. at 308.
There also have been post-Santa Fe controversies in the school district. In 2002, allegations of
indifference by school personnel to religious harassment of a Jewish student by classmates were
settled out of court for an undisclosed damages award. Erica Goldman, Santa Fe School District
Closes Second Case Involving Religion, 17 TEX. LAW., March 4, 2002, at 5.
99. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded (for
reconsideration in light of Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe), 530 U.S. 1256 (2000), reinstated on
remand sub nom. Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
916 (2001); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated and
remanded (for reconsideration in light of Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe), 531 U.S. 801 (2000),
reinstated on remand, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001).
100. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and different
results on rehearing en banc, 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1077.
102. Id. at 1074.
103. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1254.
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had permitted nonsectarian, non-proselytizing, student-initiated, voluntary
prayers, invocations, and benedictions during school-related events and
extracurricular activities.104 The district court upheld graduation prayers but
ruled that the remainder of the law failed the Lemon endorsement and coercion
standards by sweeping too broadly.105 The court also enjoined school officials
in DeKalb County from assisting students in religious activities.106 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit lifted the part of the injunction that had prohibited all
student religious expression during school, declaring that the Establishment
Clause does not require, and the Free Speech Clause does not permit,
suppression of student-initiated religious expression in public schools or
relegating it to whispers.107 The appeals court emphasized that a school policy
tolerating religion does not unconstitutionally endorse it.108 The court further
declared:
Permitting students to speak religiously signifies neither state approval nor
disapproval of that speech. The speech is not the state’s — either by
attribution or by adoption. The permission signifies no more than that the state
acknowledges its constitutional duty to tolerate religious expression. Only in
this way is true neutrality achieved.109

The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decisions in both Chandler and
Adler and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of Santa Fe,
and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reaffirmed both rulings.110 The court
recognized that school-sponsored student prayer, condemned in Santa Fe, as
well as school censorship of private student religious expression, struck down
in Chandler, are unconstitutional.111 The appellate court reiterated that the
district court’s injunction was overly broad because it equated all student
religious speech in a public context at school with expression sponsored by the
public school.112 Thus, despite Weisman and Santa Fe, the federal judiciary
continues to extend protection of student religious expression in public
schools, as long as the expression is not clearly sponsored by the school.
In one of the most expansive recent interpretations of what constitutes
private in contrast to school-sponsored religious expression, the Eighth Circuit
did not find an Establishment Clause violation in a board member’s

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3 (2003).
Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
Id. at 1568.
Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261.
Id.
Id.
Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1254; Adler, 206 F.3d at 1070.
Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1315.
Id. at 1316.
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unscheduled recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in the graduation ceremony.113
The school district had decided to eliminate the planned invocation and
benediction from the graduation ceremony after the ACLU threatened a
lawsuit. At the beginning of the ceremony, the audience was advised of the
change in the program due to the pending legal challenge. Based on the
district’s past practice of allowing school board members whose children were
graduating to speak during the ceremony, board member Scheer was given an
opportunity to deliver a short message. After brief remarks, Scheer proceeded
to recite the Lord’s Prayer and encouraged others to join him. The Eighth
Circuit found the board member’s expression to be private and thus
constitutionally protected, even though it took place at a school-sponsored
event, and Scheer was on the governing board of the school district.114 The
court concluded that there was no affirmative school sponsorship of the prayer
and declined to view Scheer as representing the school simply because of his
position.115
The trend in litigation involving student-initiated devotionals is not as clear
as the accommodationist trend pertaining to equal school access for religious
groups or to the use of public funds to support services in religious schools.
Nonetheless, courts in recent decisions seem far more likely than in the past to
rely on the Free Speech Clause in expanding First Amendment protection of
religious expression in public schools and to interpret broadly what is private
in contrast to school-sponsored expression. At the same time, the judiciary is
contracting the circumstances in public schools that would abridge the
Establishment Clause.
IV. OTHER RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES
In addition to controversies about meetings of community and student
religious groups and student-initiated devotionals in public schools, a number
of other topics have generated legal action in connection with religious
influences in public schools. This section briefly addresses the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance and the distribution and posting of religious materials in
public schools.
A.

Pledge of Allegiance

It has been well established for sixty years that schoolchildren cannot be
required to say the Pledge of Allegiance if such an observance conflicts with
their religious or philosophical beliefs. 116 In so ruling, the Supreme Court in
113. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 611-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (all facts in this
section are taken from pages 607-09 of the court’s opinion).
114. Id. at 611.
115. Id. at 612-13.
116. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette overturned a precedent
established by the Court only three years earlier.117 In Barnette, the Court held
that refusal to participate in the flag-salute and pledge does not interfere with
the rights of others to do so or threaten any type of disruption.118 Thus, state
action to compel this observance unconstitutionally “invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit” that the First Amendment is designed “to reserve from all
official control.”119 The Court declared:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.120

The controversial issue currently is whether saying the Pledge in public
schools violates the Establishment Clause because the phrase, “one nation
under God,” was added in 1954.121 In short, can public schoolchildren say the
Pledge at all without offending the Constitution?
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to
an Illinois law requiring daily recitation of the Pledge in public schools,
concluding that the words “under God” did not change this patriotic
observance into a religious exercise that advances religion.122 The appeals
court reasoned that the “ceremonial deism” in the Pledge has “lost through rote
repetition any significant religious content.”123 The court held that as long as
students could decline to participate in the Pledge, there was no First
Amendment violation.124
A Virginia federal district court similarly held that saying the Pledge in
public schools did not abridge the Establishment Clause.125 The court

117. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a Pennsylvania
law requiring the flag salute and Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, reasoning that obedience
to a general law that is not designed to promote or restrict religious beliefs can be required, even
though it conflicts with some religious convictions).
118. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
119. Id. at 642. Based on Barnette, several courts subsequently have protected students’
rights not only to decline to participate for religious or philosophical reasons in the flag-salute
ceremony, but also to register a silent protest by remaining seated during the observance. See,
e.g., Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 836 (3rd Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638-39
(2d Cir. 1973).
120. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
121. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
122. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437, 447-48
(7th Cir. 1992).
123. Id. at 447 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)).
124. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 441 (interpreting the law as requiring “willing” students to
participate; students offended by the reference to the deity would not have to say the Pledge).
125. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268-70 (E.D.Va. 2003).
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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reasoned that a civic religion has been recognized in our nation, which is
tolerated when sectarian exercises are not, and found the reference to God in
the Pledge to be “theologically benign.”126 Even though the school district at
issue considered recitation of the Pledge in a citizenship reward program, the
court rejected the contention that students were psychologically coerced into
accepting religious views sponsored by the school or punished by having to
listen to classmates recite the Pledge.127 The court noted that other factors
were also considered in making the citizenship awards, so there was no
coercion to participate in the Pledge.128 And, like the Seventh Circuit, the
district court was convinced that “under God” represents “ceremonial deism,”
which does not abridge the Establishment Clause.129
The “ceremonial deism” justification is somewhat troublesome. Whether
courts endorsing this rationale mean to limit this justification to religious
references in observances that are patriotic or at least primarily secular in
nature is not completely clear. If simply the rote repetition converts religious
phrases into permissible “ceremonial deism,” this rationale might be used to
justify the daily recital of other religious materials used in a rote manner in
public schools. One commentator has noted that this justification can insulate
“longstanding public practices that invoke a nonspecific deity for secular
purposes from Establishment Clause scrutiny.”130 It remains to be seen how
extensively this rationale will be used to condone religious references to
solemnize public events.
The Ninth Circuit attracted national attention in 2002 when it rejected the
“ceremonial deism” justification and declared that saying the Pledge in public
schools abridges the Establishment Clause by endorsing a belief in
monotheism.131 The appellate panel in Newdow v. U.S. Congress initially
applied the Lemon, coercion, and endorsement standards in reaching its
conclusion.132 In an amended, narrower ruling, the appeals court did not
126. Id. at 1267-68.
127. Id. at 1270-72.
128. Id. at 1270.
129. Id. at 1268.
130. Charles G. Warren, No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of
Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1686 (2003).
131. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002), judgment stayed, No. 0016423, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12826 (June 27, 2002), opinion amended and superseded by, 328
F.3d 466 (2003), cert. granted in part sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. 384 (2003). See also Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (issuing a
permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law requiring recitation of the Pledge or
the National Anthem each morning in schools; the law’s provision stipulating that parents of any
non-participating student will be notified is an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction on
speech).
132. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-11.
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invalidate the federal law amending the Pledge but focused on the coercive
effect of the school district’s policy requiring its recitation in public schools.133
The court found the coercive impact particularly harmful in school settings,
given the age and impressionability of children who “are required to adhere to
the norms set by their school, their teacher, and their fellow students.”134 The
court emphasized that the words “under God” had been inserted to promote
religion rather than to advance the legitimate secular goal of encouraging
patriotism.135
The appellate ruling drew immediate political responses; indeed, the
Senate passed a unanimous resolution supporting the Pledge and its reference
to “one nation under God.”136 The House passed a similar resolution by a vote
of 416 to 3.137 The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Ninth Circuit
ruling, which is being called the most important case on the Court’s 2004
docket.138
There are two issues before the Supreme Court in this case. First, does
Newdow, an atheist, have standing to challenge recitation of the Pledge as
abridging his rights to direct his daughter’s religious upbringing? This issue is
complicated by the fact that the child’s mother has custody and has indicated
that their daughter is not harmed by the Pledge being said at her school.139
Assuming that the case survives the standing issue, the Court is then asked to
address the legality of policies and laws mandating recitation of the Pledge in
public schools. The Court may rely on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning,
reiterating the “ceremonial deism” rationale,140 or it may rely on tradition and
the historical acceptance of the Pledge, as it did to condone opening legislative
sessions with prayers in Marsh v. Chambers.141

133. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487-88.
134. Id. at 488.
135. Id.
136. S. Res. 292, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S6105 (daily ed. June 27, 2002). See James
Piereson, “Under God” The History of a Phrase, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 27, 2003, at 19.
137. H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H4125 (daily ed. June 28, 2002).
138. Considerable controversy followed Justice Scalia’s comments voicing disapproval of the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, so he removed himself from the case. Thus, a four-four decision is
possible that affirms the Ninth Circuit’s ruling without establishing a national precedent.
139. See Mom: Girl Not Harmed by Pledging “Under God” (July 16, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/16/pledge.mother/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
140. In dicta in several majority, as well as concurring Supreme Court opinions, there have
been passing references to the constitutionality of the Pledge and similar secular, patriotic
observances that include a religious reference. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 602-03 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 n.5 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676, (1984); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
141. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
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Civil libertarians concede that the Pledge is a patriotic observance and not
a prayer, but nonetheless, they find it difficult to justify the addition of the
phrase “under God,” unless intended to promote religious doctrine.142 Indeed,
when President Eisenhower signed the law adding the phrase, he observed that
from that day forward, schoolchildren would proclaim “the dedication of our
nation and our people to the Almighty.”143 Additionally, the amendment’s
sponsors indicated that the purpose of the addition to the Pledge was to affirm
the United States as a religious nation distinguished from atheistic
communism.144 If the Supreme Court should strike down the contested
practice or affirm the appellate decision by a four-four split, the political
reactions are likely to be significant.
B.

Distribution of Religious Literature and Gifts

Also generating recent litigation has been the application of the First
Amendment to requests by religious groups and by students to distribute
sectarian literature and gifts that carry religious messages in public schools.
There has been no Supreme Court decision, but lower courts have consistently
ruled that public school personnel cannot distribute Bibles or other religious
materials to students.145 Most courts also have prohibited religious sects, such
as the Gideons, from coming to the school to distribute materials to willing
students, given the captive public school audience.146
The Fourth Circuit, however, upheld a West Virginia school district’s
policy allowing sectarian organizations and political groups to distribute
materials (i.e., Bibles) in public secondary schools on a designated day; such
distribution by private organizations was not found to represent the school.147

142. Pierson, supra note 136, at 19.
143. Id. One commentator has observed:
The impact cannot be lightly dismissed as de minimis. Decisions about religion are often
crucial to self identity, for believers and nonbelievers alike. The religious language in the
Pledge of Allegiance was important to those who supported its insertion in 1954, and it is
important to those who continue to support its inclusion. But it is just as important to
those Americans who feel alienated by its message of exclusion. For them, it is a big
deal.
John E. Thompson, What’s the Big Deal? The Unconstitutionality of God in the Pledge of
Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 563, 597 (2003).
144. See H.R. Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339; Steven
Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 211821 (1996).
145. See, e.g., Yazied Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 667 (W. D. La.
2001) (finding that school principal violated the Establishment Clause by distributing New
Testament Bibles to public school students).
146. See, e.g., Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993).
147. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 1998). See also
Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 577 F.2d 311, 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1978) (allowing distribution
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The court noted that the displays included a disclaimer disavowing school
sponsorship or endorsement of the materials and that access to the forum was
available to a range of religious and secular groups.148 Although the
distribution was allowed in secondary schools, the policy was invalidated at
the elementary level because younger children are more impressionable and
less able to distinguish private from school-sponsored speech.149
Recent controversies have focused on student requests to distribute
religious materials. Like student religious meetings, courts traditionally
distinguished the distribution of religious from secular literature, concluding
that public schools could bar sectarian distributions to avoid Establishment
More recently, however, Free Speech Clause
Clause violations.150
considerations have prevailed over Establishment Clause concerns, with most
courts concluding that the same legal principles govern students’ distribution
of religious and nonreligious literature.151 A Colorado federal district court
held that high school students had a free expression right to distribute a
religious newsletter in the absence of any disturbance.152 Reflecting similar
reasoning, a Pennsylvania federal district court held that junior high students
were entitled to distribute religious material during non-instructional time.153
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished public and private speech in holding
that students in an Illinois junior high school could distribute a religious
newspaper in the public school, which is a nonpublic forum, but the
distribution could be restricted to specified times at a table near the school’s
entrance.154

of Gideon Bibles in public schools under strict guidelines governing the location and means of
distribution).
148. Peck, 155 F.3d at 278.
149. Id. at 288. See also Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 707 F.
Supp. 1005, 1010 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding distribution of Gideon Bibles on the school-owned
sidewalk because the sidewalk in front of a high school was considered a public forum for general
use).
150. See Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546, 551 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that a student religious club did not have a right to distribute its materials on
the high school campus or advertise in the school’s yearbook because the school had not created a
limited forum for noncurriculum student groups, and even if it had, the Establishment Clause
would prohibit using the school’s authority to promote religious groups).
151. See infra notes 152-163 and accompanying text.
152. Rivera v. E. Otero Sch. Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (D. Colo. 1989). See also
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1545 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the same rules
to the distribution of religious and secular student literature).
153. Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
See also Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
154. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 807 F. Supp. 444, 462-63 (N.D. Ill. 1992),
aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993) (also upholding the part
of the district’s policy restricting distribution of materials prepared by non-students to ten or
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In a higher education decision, the Supreme Court in 1995 ruled that a
public university could not withhold support from a student religious group
seeking to use student activity funds to publish sectarian materials.155 The
majority’s holding — that religious material must be treated like other material
in student-initiated publications subsidized by the university — has
implications for literature distribution in public schools.156 The Court declared
that the government’s equal treatment of religious and secular private
expression is not only permitted by the Establishment Clause but in some
circumstances is required by the Free Speech Clause.157
More recently, the Ninth Circuit found viewpoint discrimination in a
school district’s refusal to allow the distribution of flyers for a summer
camp.158 The district allowed literature to be distributed during noninstructional time but prohibited commercial, political, or religious
materials.159 School authorities rejected distribution of the camp flyers
because two of the camp’s offerings were religious in nature (Bible Heroes and
Bible Tales).160 Recognizing the “confusing intersection of First Amendment
rights,” the court nonetheless ruled that the district’s prohibition on selected
perspectives violated the Free Speech Clause and did not implicate the
Establishment Clause.161 The court reasoned that the school district had
created a forum with the broad purpose of providing a community service by
notifying students and their parents about activities of interest.162 The court
recognized, however, that the school district could require any proselytizing
language to be removed from the flyer.163
Conflicting opinions have been rendered recently regarding student
distribution of gifts with religious messages to classmates. A Massachusetts
federal district court issued an injunction against school authorities who were
prohibiting members of a high school religious club from distributing candy
canes with religious messages during non-instructional time.164 The court
reasoned that the distribution did not represent the school and was thus
fewer copies, reasoning that it is an important part of education for students to learn to express
themselves in their own words).
155. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 820 (1995).
156. Id. at 845-46.
157. Id. at 846. See Arval A. Morris, Separation of Church and State — Remarks on
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 553,-571 (1995).
158. Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004).
159. Id. at 1047.
160. Id. at 1046, 1048.
161. Id. at 1046, 1056.
162. Id. at 1051.
163. Hills, 329 F.3d at 1052-53.
164. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass.
2003).
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protected private expression under the First Amendment.165 Yet, the Third
Circuit upheld the school officials’ action in prohibiting elementary school
students from distributing pencils and candy canes with religious messages
during classroom holiday parties.166 The court concluded that reasonable
accommodations were made because religious materials could be distributed
before and after school and during recess.167 The court noted the difficulty
young children would have in distinguishing school sponsorship from private
religious expression during school activities.168
The key factors in the constitutional assessment are when and where the
materials are distributed (i.e., during class or non-instructional time) and who
distributes the materials (i.e., students or school personnel). The age of the
students is also a concern, as older children have a greater ability to
comprehend that materials distributed by classmates do not represent the
school. Even when established that religious materials can be distributed, the
students must comply with the same time, place, and manner regulations
applied to the distribution of secular materials.169 Although reasonable
restrictions on how and when materials are distributed have been upheld,
school districts can no longer use the Establishment Clause as justification for
a blanket ban on student distribution of religious literature.170
C. Posting Religious Documents
This topic is addressed here not only because it is evoking current legal
activity, but also because it illustrates the limits on religious accommodations
in public schools. Most of these controversies involve challenged actions of
school personnel. In contrast to the permissible distribution of religious
materials by private actors during non-instructional time, teachers cannot post
the same sectarian documents in their classrooms.171 To date, federal courts
have not allowed the Ten Commandments and other religious materials to be
posted in public schools, despite mixed decisions regarding the legality of

165. Id. at 117-18.
166. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3597 (2004).
167. Id. at 280.
168. Id. at 277.
169. See Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1351, 1353-54 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (supporting a school
policy requiring students to give the principal advance warning of the distribution and to submit a
copy of the literature to the superintendent, but not for approval purposes; the policy was not an
unconstitutional prior restraint on a student’s distribution of religious tracts).
170. See Johnston-Loehner v. O’Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575, 580 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (striking
down a policy requiring students to get the superintendent’s approval before distributing any
materials on campus; this prior restraint on distributing religious invitations and pamphlets
inhibited religion in violation of the Establishment Clause).
171. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997).
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religious displays on public property in cases outside the school domain.172
The Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky law authorizing the posting of the
Ten Commandments in public schools more than twenty years ago,173 but this
ruling did not dampen efforts in this regard. Indeed, since September 11, 2001,
efforts to post religious documents in public buildings seem to have
increased.174
Several federal courts recently have been called on to review policies and
laws calling for the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings,
including schools. In an Indiana case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a
monument with the Ten Commandments placed on government property
violated the Establishment Clause.175 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit ordered the
Ten Commandments to be removed from displays at the entrance of four Ohio
high schools.176 The Sixth Circuit also held that a school’s display of a portrait
of Jesus in a school hallway advanced religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.177
In contrast, a Virginia federal district court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to the application of a state law requiring the posting of “In
God We Trust” in public schools.178 The challenge asserted that the motto was
posted with a religious design supplied by a conservative group and therefore
advanced religion.179 The relief sought was to replace the poster with a
religiously neutral design and clear identification of the phrase as the national
motto. Finding the motto to be secular, the court concluded that the posters in
question did not offend the Establishment Clause.180

172. See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(upholding the Ku Klux Klan’s display of an unattended cross on state-owned property during
Christmas season); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding display of
Menorah with a Christmas tree in front of a government building as celebrating religious liberty,
but striking down display of the nativity scene with a religious banner in county courthouse as
advancing the Christian faith); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding use of public
funds to erect a Christmas display with the nativity scene in a private park).
173. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
174. American Atheists, Religious Brush Wars Over Slogans, Creationism, Prayer Spread
(Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/igwt4.html.
175. See ICLU v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162
(2002). See also Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 307 (7th Cir. 2000).
176. Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 929 (6th Cir. 2002). See
also ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist.,
96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
177. Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Joki
v. Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (enjoining the display of a religious painting
in the public high school auditorium).
178. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (E.D. Va. 2003).
179. Id. at 1273.
180. Id. at 1270.
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In an unusual Pennsylvania case, a federal district court rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a school district’s winter display and
program that included a menorah, Kwanzaa candelabra and cloth, books about
Kwanzaa and Hanukkah, a “giving” tree, books on holidays, a banner with
“Happy Holidays,” Hanukkah songs, a Kwanzaa chant, and secular Christmas
songs (i.e., Frosty the Snowman).181 The thrust of the complaint was that the
display and program were not “Christian enough.”182 Disagreeing, the court
reasoned that the intent of the program and display was to celebrate religious
diversity and the freedom for individuals to choose their own beliefs.183 There
was no Establishment Clause violation because the program did not promote a
particular faith at the expense of others.184
A federal district court in New Jersey also found that inclusion of religious
holidays such as Christmas and Hanukkah on school calendars did not violate
the Establishment Clause.185 The court reasoned that depiction of the holidays
was designed to broaden students’ sensitivity toward religious diversity and
their understanding of the role of religion in society.186
A few cases have addressed private choices, rather than school decisions,
to post religious documents or inscriptions in school buildings or on school
grounds. For example, a Virginia federal district court addressed a First
Amendment challenge to a high school’s ban on placing religious inscriptions
on bricks placed on the school’s “walk of fame.”187 Initially, patrons could
choose to put crosses on their bricks, but school authorities subsequently
removed bricks with crosses because of Establishment Clause concerns. The
school provided replacement bricks for those removed. Several patrons who
had selected crosses challenged the school’s action. The court recognized that
181. Sechler v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
One of the plaintiffs in this case, David Saxe, had sued the school district on other occasions
alleging that his Christian beliefs were not provided sufficient recognition or were discriminated
against by school district policies. See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200
(3d Cir. 2001).
182. Sechler, 121 F. Supp. at 446. See also Skoros v. City of New York, No. CV-02-6439
(CPS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (holding that the exclusion of
crèches in a school’s holiday display with symbols of Kwanzaa, Hanukkah, Ramadan, and
Christmas did not reflect unconstitutional hostility toward Christianity, but instead served the
holiday display policy’s secular purpose by limiting the symbols to those that had developed
significant secular connotations).
183. Sechler, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
184. Id. See also Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980)
(finding no Establishment Clause violation in the prudent and objective observance of Christmas,
given its historical and cultural significance, even though the program included religious songs,
such as Silent Night, and displayed the nativity scene).
185. Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 930 (D.N.J. 1993).
186. Id. at 932.
187. Demmon v. Loudoun County Pub. Schs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689, 691-92 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(all facts in this section are taken from pages 691-92 of the court’s opinion).
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restrictions in a limited forum, such as the walk of fame, must relate to the
purpose of the forum and be viewpoint neutral.188 Noting that the Supreme
Court has not clarified whether a concern about avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation can justify viewpoint discrimination in a limited forum, the
court declined to dismiss as a matter of law the plaintiffs’ free speech claims or
their claim that the exclusion of any religious symbols on the walk inhibited
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.189 However, the court found
no special disabilities placed on the plaintiffs because of their religion and thus
dismissed the Free Exercise Clause claim.190
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit upheld a school district’s prohibition on
religious messages on decorative tiles to commemorate the fatal shootings at
Columbine High School in 1999.191 The court concluded that the project
entailed school-sponsored speech, pertained to pedagogical concerns, and
would reasonably be perceived to represent the school.192 Thus, the school
district’s restrictions on the inscriptions on the tiles did not have to be
viewpoint neutral because they were related to the pedagogical concern of
preventing the walls from generating religious debate that would disrupt the
learning environment.193
The Seventh Circuit in 2001 also upheld a principal’s action in barring a
student religious group from including a large cross in the group’s hallway
mural.194 All student groups had been invited to paint hallway murals, and
their sketches were reviewed by the principal, who rejected the cross as well as
other groups’ use of a swastika and a brand of beer.195 The Court of Appeals
found no EAA violation, noting that the Act does not restrict the authority of
the school to maintain order and discipline.196 The court reasoned that the

188. Id. at 694.
189. Id. at 696-98.
190. Id. at 698.
191. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 934 (10th Cir. 2002). See
also Anderson v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding
exclusion of school walkway bricks with Christian messages).
192. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
193. Id. In some instances community groups have sought school access for religious
advertisements. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the school could bar religious advertisements from the fence surrounding its
baseball field because the fence was a nonpublic forum open only for limited purposes; fears
about violating the Establishment Clause were reasonable, and the exclusion of religious ads was
not viewpoint discrimination).
194. Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469-70 (7th Cir. 2001).
195. Id. at 466.
196. Id. at 467.
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principal was justified in acting against the three proposals that he feared
would lead to lawsuits or disorder.197
It seems easier to build the case that the posting of religious documents and
inscriptions, regardless of the initiators, will be viewed as school sponsored if
posted in school facilities or on school grounds. Unlike the distribution of
literature, where individuals can decline to accept the material and can
ascertain that those offering the literature do not represent the school,
documents that are posted in school buildings or on school grounds are more
permanent and available for all to view whether they want to or not.
V. FEDERAL GUIDANCE: CLARIFICATION OR CONFUSION?
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, signed into law in 2002, is the
most comprehensive reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.198 Among its many provisions, the NCLB Act requires
school districts to certify to the state educational agency that no school policy
prevents or denies participation in constitutionally protected prayer in public
elementary and secondary schools.199 For the first time, such certification is
required and tied to federal aid.200 In short, federal funds can be withheld from
school districts that are not in compliance with the certification requirement.
States were given until April 15, 2003 to submit the initial list of local
school districts that had not filed the required certification, and such lists must
be submitted by November 1st in all subsequent years.201 Although a number
of school districts and a few states had not certified their compliance by the
initial deadline, the Department of Education reported in June 2003 that all
fifty states and the District of Columbia had met the certification
requirement,202 and the Department does not anticipate withholding federal
funds from school districts in the future.
The NCLB Act also requires the U.S. Secretary of Education to issue
guidance to school districts regarding permissible religious activities.203
Accordingly, in February 2003, the U.S. Department of Education issued its
Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and

197. Id. at 466 (the court did not address the claim that suppressing sectarian symbols violated
the religion clauses).
198. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2002)).
199. 20 U.S.C. § 7904 (2002).
200. Id.
201. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 68 Fed. Reg. 9645, 9646 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Guidance].
202. Mark Walsh, States Say They’re Following Prayer Proviso, EDUC. WK., June 4, 2003, at
21, 23.
203. 20 U.S.C. § 7904 (2002).
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Secondary Schools,204 intended to identify religious activities that must be
allowed in public schools. The Guidance covers a number of areas, and for
those topics without a definitive Supreme Court ruling, it supports conservative
citizen groups’ expansive interpretation of permissible religious activities in
public schools.205 As a result, there are discrepancies between the Guidance
and some judicial decisions. Joseph Conn of Americans United for Separation
of Church and State has noted that the Guidance is “really pushing the
envelope on religion in public schools.”206
For example, the Guidance stipulates that student speakers at
extracurricular events, including sporting events, can express religious views,
as long as neutral criteria are used to select the speakers.207 However, the
Guidance statement is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s position
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, where the Court struck down
student-led devotionals at public school football games because the
devotionals, delivered over the school’s public address system at a schoolsponsored event and under the supervision of school personnel, could not be
considered private expression.208 The Guidance suggests that if the students
had been selected by neutral criteria, the prayers would have been
constitutionally permissible,209 but the Supreme Court did not so rule in Santa
Fe.210 It was not only the student election deciding whether to have the
devotionals that offended the Establishment Clause; given the setting and use
of school equipment and facilities, the devotionals were viewed as being
endorsed by the public school.211
The Guidance also states that teachers and other school employees can
participate in devotional meetings during non-instructional time (i.e., before
school, during lunch), as long as they are not representing the public school.212
This conflicts with an earlier Seventh Circuit decision that faculty have no
First Amendment right to hold prayer meetings in public schools before
students arrive.213 Moreover, it seems unrealistic to expect elementary-age
children to be able to ascertain when their teachers are functioning as “private”
individuals rather than as their teachers. Allowing teachers to participate in
prayer meetings before school seems to stretch the meaning of private
expression far beyond any judicial precedents.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9645.
Id.
Walsh, supra note 202, at 25.
Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000). See also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647-48.
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290-91.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647.
See May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1986).
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The Guidance further stipulates that students may express their religious
views in their homework, artwork, and other written and oral assignments.214
Yet, several courts have ruled that school personnel can censor student
presentations to ensure that students are not proselytizing their classmates.215
In most of these cases, the schools have prevailed in denying the students’
requests. For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a school district’s prohibition
of an elementary school student from showing, during class, a videotape of
herself singing a proselytizing religious song.216 Recognizing that the public
school curriculum is supervised by faculty and designed to impart knowledge,
the appeals court held that student projects could be censored.217 The same
court backed a junior high school teacher who gave a student a zero on a report
because the student had cleared a different topic with the teacher but then
wrote her report on the life of Jesus Christ.218
The Guidance states that “students may pray with fellow students during
the school day on the same terms and conditions that they may engage in other
conversation or speech.”219 This statement sweeps far more broadly than do
judicial interpretations of the First Amendment. Whereas schoolchildren
engage in numerous secular conversations with classmates during the
instructional day, most courts have relegated student-led devotionals to noninstructional time.220 Yet, the Guidance makes it sound like a contrary
position is well-settled law in this area.
Barry Lynn, Executive Director of Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, has asserted that the Guidance places school officials
“between a rock and a hard place in either obeying the interpretation of law
from the administration, or following the dictates of their local federal
courts.”221 Given its potential conflicts with judicial rulings, the Guidance has
not clarified what religious activities are permissible in public schools.
Instead, the Guidance may actually trigger additional litigation as courts and
legislative bodies struggle to identify the appropriate church/state relationship
in public education.

214. Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647.
215. See, e.g., C. H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915
(2001) (reasoning that teachers can exercise viewpoint-neutral regulations reasonably related to
legitimate educational purposes to govern classroom activities).
216. DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Schs., No. 92-2080, 1993 WL 477030, *1, *3 (6th Cir. 1993).
217. Id.
218. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995).
219. Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647.
220. See discussion supra Part III.A.
221. Walsh, supra note 202, at 23.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The principle that the First Amendment demands government neutrality
toward religion has been easier to assert than to apply.222 From the 1960s
through the mid-1980s the federal judiciary seemed more committed to
enforcing Establishment Clause restrictions in elementary and secondary
school settings than elsewhere, given the vulnerability of the young captive
audience. Recently, however, courts have seemed more inclined to support
government accommodation of religion in the school context, thus
relinquishing what has been the last stronghold of separationist doctrine.
A hierarchy of First Amendment freedoms seems to be in place. Although
the Supreme Court has skillfully avoided a direct confrontation between the
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, free speech guarantees clearly have
On the winding path toward
been dominant in recent cases.223
accommodation, only blatant efforts by school personnel to impose devotional
activities in public schools have been invalidated.224 By focusing on the
expressive aspect of devotionals and continually expanding what is considered
private expression, courts have a powerful justification for protecting religious
expression and diminishing the circumstances that would trigger the
Establishment Clause. Indeed, with the expansive Free Speech Clause
protection of private religious expression in public schools, the EAA seems
unnecessary.
It may appear that saying brief prayers and posting religious documents in
public schools represent a minor encroachment on individuals’ religious
liberties. But, larger inroads are likely to follow as groups and individuals
continue to press the limits of the Establishment Clause. The recent judicial
leniency in authorizing religious influences initiated by private actors in public
schools combined with the trend of allowing more government aid to religious
schools225 suggests that the Establishment Clause has lost its former vitality as
an independent constitutional guarantee. The federal government is supporting
222. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (declaring that “government in
our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and
practice”). Justice Harlan’s observation that “neutrality is . . . a coat of many colors” certainly
has proven to be true. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
223. See supra note 69. See also Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211,
226 (3d Cir. 2003); supra note 49 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down schoolorchestrated elections to authorize student-led prayers before football games); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down clergy-led graduation prayer); supra notes 70, 91 and
accompanying text.
225. For at least a decade, the Supreme Court has steadily become more lenient in applying
Establishment Clause restrictions to government aid for provision of services and materials in
religious schools. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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this accommodationist trend with administrative policies and its position in
amicus curiae briefs.226 Furthermore, this doctrinal change may portend a
significant transformation in the nature and structure of education in our
nation, with more religious influences in public schools and increased state aid
to sectarian schools.
Many devoutly religious Americans contend that separation of church and
state is in the best interest of religious practice as well as government policies,
because when government and religion are united, both are harmed in
significant ways.227 Justice Brennan once observed that “it is not only the
nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies
into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the
secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and
dependent upon the government.”228
One does not have to look back in history to find examples of the negative
results of commingling religion and government. Indeed, today there are daily
reminders that religious establishments generate strife and war. Nonetheless,
efforts to put government support behind the dominant faith in our nation
continue to escalate. Our citizenry would be wise to revisit a statement made
by the Supreme Court fifty years ago: “There cannot be the slightest doubt that
the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that church and state should be
separated . . . . [T]he separation must be complete and unequivocal.”229
Unfortunately, there is plenty of doubt today.

226. See, e.g., Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Davey v. Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (No. 02-1315).
227. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
228. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring).
229. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).

